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This article uses a new panel data set to perform a statistical analysis of
political regimes and sovereign credit risk in Europe from 1750 to 1913.
Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and
absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries
had centralized institutions and limited government. Panel regressions
indicate that centralized and/or limited regimes were associated with
significant improvements in credit risk relative to fragmented and
absolutist ones. Structural break tests also reveal close relationships
between major turning points in yield series and political transformations.
1. Introduction
This article examines the relationship between political regimes and
sovereign credit risk over the long run. The chosen period, 1750–1913,
captures key transformations to European political institutions. Study of
the process of financial development in Europe is also valuable because
countries around the world have implemented its forms of fiscal governance.1
An understanding of the European growth experience thus translates into
useful lessons for emerging economies today.
Our framework for analysis follows Dincecco (2009a) and consists of
two core elements. The first comes from North and Weingast (1989).
They claim that institutional reforms with the Glorious Revolution of 1688
allowed the English crown to make a credible commitment to responsible
debt service.2 Since the new constitution gave parliament a regular right to
monitor spending decisions, the executive could keep promises to execute
1 See, for instance, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998, 1999) and
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008).
2 Also see Dickson (1967), Jones (1972), Stone (1979) and Hill (1980). It is debatable
whether political changes associated with the Glorious Revolution actually improved
property rights protections. Clark (1996) argues that secure property rights existed in
England from 1600 while O’Brien (2001) claims that England implemented key
constitutional and administrative structures in the 1640s. Moreover, Sussman and Yafeh
(2006) find that the reforms of 1688 did not significantly lower British capital costs over
the next century. Yet scholars often use North and Weingast’s work as a point of departure.
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fiscal plans in time-consistent ways.3 The second part comes from Epstein
(2000). He argues that institutional fragmentation within countries and not
fiscal abuse by rulers was the fundamental cause of fiscal distortions prior
to the 1800s.4 In fragmented polities, there was a close relationship between
local tax control and political autonomy. Thus, elites had strong incentives
to oppose structural reforms that threatened traditional rights. The result
was a classic public goods problem, since each locality wished to free ride
on the tax contributions of others. Dincecco (2009a) finds that per-capita
revenues collected by fragmented sovereignties were low. A lack of resources
made it difficult for national governments to repay debts. Centralized from
medieval times, England – the example that North and Weingast proffer –
was exceptional.5
I argue that the political transformations identified by North and Weingast
and Epstein were complementary rather than competing elements of sound
fiscal policy. By 1913, many European countries had struck an institutional
balance that allowed national governments to gather enough in tax revenues
while limiting executive discretion over expenditures. To evaluate my
hypothesis, I adopt a systematic approach that examines the effects of
political reforms on sovereign credit risk both within and across European
polities. My investigation thus complements case study texts by Hoffman
and Norberg (1994), Bonney (1999), Bordo and Corte´s-Conde (2001) and
others.6
I first construct a new panel data set on government bond yields for 11
European countries. Long yearly series of relevant fiscal data characterize
group 1, which includes many of the largest and/or most important players
See, among others, Frey and Kucher (2000), Sussman and Yafeh (2000, 2006), Quinn
(2001), Stasavage (2003, 2005) and Summerhill (2004).
3 Several works use the concept of credible commitment to explain macroeconomic
differences between eighteenth-century rivals Britain and France. These include Mathias
and O’Brien (1976), Weir (1989), Hoffman and Norberg (1994), Rosenthal (1998),
O’Brien (2001) and White (2001).
4 Also see Brewer (1989), Henshall (1992), Hoffman and Norberg (1994), Hoffman and
Rosenthal (1997), Rosenthal (1998) and O’Brien (2001).
5 Brewer (1989), Sacks (1994), Epstein (2000) and O’Brien (2001).
6 Qualitative comparative studies of European fiscal history include Tilly (1990), Bonney
(1995) and O’Brien (2001). There exists a ‘sister’ cross-country literature on the political
economy of international bond markets during the classic gold standard era. See, for
instance, Flandreau and Zumer (1994), Bordo and Rockoff (1996), Obstfeld and Taylor
(2003), Ferguson (2006) and Ferguson and Schularick (2006). By the 1870s, however,
most European governments were administratively centralized democracies. For an earlier
era, Stasavage (2005) also examines the politics of sovereign debt in Europe. One
advantage of the present work is that it employs market-determined rather than nominal
yields, which provide direct measures of investor perceptions of credit risk. Other papers
that use historical bond series to measure the impact of economic and political factors on
fiscal performance include Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh (2002), Mitchener and Weidenmier
(2005) and Brown, Burdekin and Weidenmier (2006).
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in Europe at the time: England, France, the Netherlands, Prussia, and
Spain. The second group (Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, Italy,
Portugal, and Sweden) has shorter data series. I then classify political regimes
according to Dincecco (2009a). Fiscal centralization was typically the result
of French conquest from 1789 to 1815. Limited government generally took
place decades after centralization during the 1800s.
The statistical framework that I use is innovative in that it consists of
two components not often employed together: regressions on the panel data
set and structural break tests. The regressions incorporate a relevant set of
control variables (violent conflict, economic growth, and fiscal and monetary
policy) to assess the effects of political regimes on sovereign credit risk. For
robustness, I include structural break tests that assume no a priori knowledge
of major turning points. The statistical inquiry supports the argument that
political transformations towards centralized and limited regimes led to
significant creditworthiness improvements.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines the
relationship between political regimes and creditworthiness. Section 3
describes the data and sample countries. Section 4 examines the data on
a case-by-case basis. Section 5 discusses the statistical framework. Section 6
presents the statistical results. Section 7 concludes.
2. Political regimes and sovereign risk
2.1. Historical overview
This section describes the relationship between political arrangements and
sovereign credit risk. The classification of political regimes follows Dincecco
(2009a), who argues that national governments completed the process of
fiscal centralization the year that they began to secure revenues by way of
a tax system with uniform rates throughout the country. Dincecco claims
that limited government emerged the year in which parliament gained the
constitutional right to control the national budget on an annual basis.
For stability, parliament’s power of the purse had to hold for at least two
consecutive decades.
Tables 1 and 2 reproduce Dincecco’s dates for fiscal centralization and
limited government. The first table indicates that fiscal centralization took
place swiftly and permanently throughout much of the Continent from 1789
onwards. The National Assembly transformed the tax system in France by
eliminating traditional exemptions and privileges. Napoleon completed this
process after his coup in 1799. French conquest of Belgium, the Dutch
Republic and several Italian polities led to significant tax reforms. After
defeat in battle by France in 1806, Prussia also made major fiscal innovations.
The second table indicates that limited government reforms began during
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Table 1. Fiscal centralization in Europe
Year Event
Group 1 England 1066 Norman conquest and subsequent
erosion of provincial authority
France 1790 Administrative reforms after Revolution
of 1789
Netherlands 1806 Administrative reforms under French
control (1795–1813)
Prussia 1806 Administrative reforms after defeat in
battle by French in 1806
Spain 1844 Administrative reforms during
‘Moderate’ decade of 1840s
Group 2 Denmark 1688 Establishment of official cadastre system
Belgium 1795 Administrative reforms after French
annexation in 1795
Portugal 1832 Administrative reforms during
Revolutionary era (1820–51)
Sweden 1840 ‘Departmental’ reforms
Austria–Hungary 1848 Administrative reforms during Year of
Revolutions
Italy 1861 Establishment of Kingdom and
subsequent fiscal unification
Source: Dincecco (2009a).
Notes: The first column lists sample countries by group. Long annual data series over a
variety of political regimes characterize group 1, which includes the largest and/or most
important players in Europe at the time. Group 2 has shorter data series. The second
column displays the year that fiscal centralization was completed. The final column offers
brief ‘explanations’ for the dates.
the 1830s and 1840s, several decades after centralization. A second wave
occurred in the 1860s and 1870s.
Some exceptions bear mention. At one extreme, England had centralized
institutions and parliamentary government long before most Continental
regimes. At the other, the French failed in their attempts to make
administrative changes in Iberia: fiscal centralization in Portugal and Spain
did not happen until 1832 and 1844, respectively. Though political risks and
instability dominated the peninsula over the 1800s, stable limited regimes
were established in Portugal in 1851 and in Spain in 1876.
2.2. Theoretical implications
By establishing parliament’s power of the purse, limited government reduced
the likelihood of poor spending choices by executives. Ceteris paribus, it
should have improved sovereign credit risk, as expressed by a reduction
in yield spreads over benchmark British consols, relative to absolutist
regimes. The relationship between fiscal centralization and credit risk is less
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Table 2. Limited government in Europe
Year Event
Group 1 Netherlands 1572 Formation of Dutch Republic (1572–1795)
1848 Implementation of new constitution
England 1688 Establishment of constitutional monarchy
Prussia 1848 Establishment of constitutional monarchy
France 1870 Establishment of stable constitutional
regime
Spain 1876 Establishment of stable constitutional
monarchy
Group 2 Denmark None Absolutism restored (1866) after
short-lived constitutional regime
Belgium 1831 Established as a constitutional monarchy
Portugal 1851 Establishment of stable constitutional
monarchy
Italy 1861 Established as a constitutional monarchy
Sweden 1866 Dissolution of Estates and introduction of
bicameral legislature
Austria–Hungary 1867 Establishment of constitutional monarchy
Source: Dincecco (2009a).
Notes: The first column lists sample countries by group, which Table 1 describes. The
second column displays the year that limited government emerged. The final column offers
brief ‘explanations’ for the dates.
straightforward. On one hand, centralization generated a significant increase
in per-capita revenues (see Dincecco 2009a), which made it easier for crowns
to follow sound fiscal policies. Thus, credit risk should have fallen. On the
other hand, consolidation of fiscal powers by monarchs may have aggravated
problems of executive control. There was always the danger that executives
would waste new revenues on ill-advised wars. If so, then credit risk should
have increased after centralization.
Table 3 summarizes the sovereign credit risk characteristics of the
four possible political regimes: fragmented and absolutist, centralized and
absolutist, fragmented and limited, and centralized and limited. Note
that there was only one example of the fragmented and limited regime
among sample countries.7 Credit risk under centralized and limited regimes
should have been lower than under fragmented and absolutist ones. By
eliminating local free riding, fiscal centralization implied an increase in public
funds. Similarly, limited government established spending constraints on
executives. The combination of greater revenues and parliamentary control
should have improved credit risk.
By the same logic, credit risk should have decreased under fragmented and
limited regimes in comparison with fragmented and absolutist ones. Theory
cannot predict if there was an improvement in credit risk under centralized
7 This was the Dutch Republic (1572–1795). For additional details, see Section 4.
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Table 3. Sovereign credit risk characteristics of political regimes
Regime Government bond yields
Fragmented and absolutist High due to local free-riding and lack of
credible commitment
Centralized and absolutist Decrease due to resolution of local free-riding but
still no credible commitment
Fragmented and limited Decrease due to credible commitment but still
local free-riding
Centralized and limited Low due to resolution of local free-riding and
credible commitment
Sources: See text.
and absolutist regimes in comparison with fragmented and absolutist ones,
since fiscal centralization generated additional funds that executives may have
used to repay debts or spent recklessly. However, we may say definitively that
credit risk under centralized and limited regimes should have been the lowest
of all, since both sorts of fiscal problems had been resolved.
3. Data and sample countries
I assembled a database on long-term government bonds in Europe from 1750
to 1913. Appendix 1 documents the data sources and construction methods
for each sample country. Since bond prices often exhibited high volatility,
the use of annual data (i.e. one observation per year) increases the likelihood
of misrepresenting yield trends. To avoid this possibility, I calculated yearly
averages of weekly or monthly data. The yield series came in large part
from secondary sources such as the Global Financial Database (GFD), which
offered high-frequency data. For accuracy, I compared the GFD series that
I computed with annual data from Homer and Sylla (1991).
The historical nature of the yield series merits special attention. To begin,
demand for sovereign bonds was not integrated or elastic. Governments
faced different domestic and international opportunities to market their
debts. As Appendix 1 describes, bonds for group 1 countries were typically
traded on home exchanges, whereas bonds for group 2 countries were
traded on the London Stock Exchange. Prior to 1815, most governments
did not offer a public asset comparable to the British consol (i.e. perpetual,
dominant, easily negotiable and relatively risk-free), but instead issued
a multitude of debt instruments, each subject to different terms and
conditions. In such cases, I chose the sovereign bond that best captured
long-term yield levels. Appendix 1 provides the details.
The sample was divided into two groups based on data availability and
historical importance. Annual published series of nearly a century or more
for government bonds as well as for a variety of controls typically existed
for the five polities (England, France, the Netherlands, Prussia and Spain)
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that comprised the first set. Not only were these countries among the largest
and/or most powerful players in Western Europe at the time, but for them
data were also available over a variety of political regimes.
Shorter published time series existed for the six countries (Austria-
Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Sweden) in the second
group. Data for Belgium and Italy only began after they were founded
as constitutional monarchies in 1831 and 1861, respectively. Annual series
for Austria-Hungary, Portugal, and Sweden did not start until after the
establishment of centralized and limited regimes during the 1800s.8 Since
Denmark did not achieve a stable form of constitutional government by 1913,
it functioned as an additional ‘absolutist’ control in the regressions. Though
data prior to political transformations were not available for the second set
of countries, their inclusion enriched the sample by expanding the range of
institutional experiences.
4. Case studies
Table 4 displays the summary statistics for the yield panel.9 In total, there
are 864 observations, 62 for fragmented and absolutist regimes, 294 for
centralized and absolutist ones, and 492 for centralized and limited ones;
16 observations characterize the lone fragmented and limited regime. One
immediately notices that average yields associated with centralized and
absolutist regimes (5.41 percent) and centralized and limited ones (4.52
percent) were low relative to fragmented and absolutist ones (7.20 percent).
Average yields for the fragmented and limited regime (3.09 percent) were
also much lower.10
Before moving on to the statistical analysis, it is worthwhile to study
France and the Netherlands, two sample polities for which long data series
are available. Figure 1, which plots yield spreads between French long-term
government bonds and British consols from 1750 to 1913, indicates that yield
8 Though Ferguson (2006) collected yield data for Austria–Hungary from 1844 onwards,
the series was discontinuous through 1870. My yield series for Austria–Hungary began in
1874. Following Dincecco (2009a, 2009b), I designated Portugal as a group 2 country.
However, it differed from other group 2 countries because its yield series began in 1823,
before fiscal centralization and limited government. In Section 4, I analyze the Portuguese
case in the same way as for group 1 countries. I also perform the structural break tests for
Portugal in Section 6. Continuous Portuguese revenue and expenditure series did not
begin until 1852. Since the regression analysis used budgetary data as an economic
control, Portuguese yield observations prior to political transformations were lost. Yet
econometric specifications that excluded budgetary data and hence used the entire
Portuguese yield series did not significantly alter the findings.
9 I followed Ferguson and Schularick (2006) and excluded 16 observations with yields of
20 percent or more from the econometric analysis. These were the Netherlands, 1811,
1813, and Spain, 1824–33, 1876–9. However, the regression results were robust to
specifications that included all observations.
10 This was the Dutch Republic, which I discuss below.
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Table 4. Summary statistics of yield data (as percents per year)
Obs. Mean St. dev. Min Max
All regimes 864 4.76 1.95 2.41 16.19
Fragmented and absolutist 62 7.20 3.09 3.34 15.65
Centralized and absolutist 294 5.41 2.10 3.27 16.19
Fragmented and limited 16 3.09 0.53 2.41 4.33
Centralized and limited 492 4.52 1.43 2.45 16.15
Sources: See Appendix 1.
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Figure 1. Yield spreads, France, 1750–1913
Sources: See Appendix 1.
spreads were typically 200 basis points or more under the fragmented and
absolutist regime. The French Revolution (1789–99) led to the establishment
of a national tax system with uniform rates. Spreads remained high through
the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Unlike the eighteenth century, however,
France no longer defaulted on its debts.11
French yield spreads decreased after 1815. The short-lived constitutional
‘July’ regime (1830–47) saw spreads that were less than 50 basis points.12
Under the authoritarian regime of Napoleon III (1851–70), however, they
doubled to over 100 basis points. Spreads fell steadily after the establishment
11 Defaults prior to 1789 occurred in 1715, 1759 and 1770. See Sargent and Velde (1995).
12 The 1830 regime was not classified as limited because it endured for less than two
decades. However, I categorized it as such for one of the robustness checks in Section 6.
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Figure 2. Yield spreads, Netherlands, 1780–1913
Sources: See Appendix 1.
of a stable centralized and limited regime in 1870. By the start of the 1890s,
they neared zero.
Figure 2 plots yield spreads in basis points between Dutch long-term
government bonds and British consols from 1780 to 1913. I followed
Dincecco’s (2009a) classification of the political regime in the Dutch
Republic (1572–1795) as fragmented and limited. By investing heavily in
government bonds, ruling elites aligned lender and borrower incentives and
provided a credible commitment to repay debts. Figure 2 highlights the
success of this mechanism. Since the Republic received loans at lower rates
of interest than Britain, spreads at the start of the 1780s were negative.
Van Zanden and van Riel (2004), however, argue that widespread fiscal
fragmentation hindered the ability of the Republic to raise funds and service
debts. Indeed, spreads rose quickly in the years before the French conquered
the Netherlands in 1795.13
The 1815 constitution granted absolutist control to King Willem I, who
came to power at the end of the Napoleonic era. Parliamentary budget
authority, promulgated at 10-year intervals, was ineffective. Spending heavily
on the military, on infrastructure, and on the monarchy itself, Willem
was unable to balance the national accounts, though fiscal centralization
13 Also see Fritschy and van der Voort (1997), t’Hart (1997), Fritschy, t’Hart and Horlings
(2001), van Zanden and van Riel (2004), van Zanden and Prak (2006) and Fritschy
(2007).
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Figure 3. Yield spreads, Spain, 1821–1913
Sources: See Appendix 1.
in 1806 had roughly doubled the size of the Dutch tax base and Europe
was politically stable. Dincecco (2009b) argues that rapid growth in Dutch
deficits from 1815 onwards reflected the reckless policies that Willem
pursued. Yield spreads rose with the Belgian Revolt of 1830 and subsequent
War of Independence (1830–1833).14 In hope of reclaiming Belgium, Willem
continued to spend great sums on the military. During the 1830s, Dutch
spreads remained around 150 basis points higher than spreads under the
constitutional ‘July’ regime in France. When Dutch fiscal troubles finally
became public in 1839, parliament vetoed the upcoming decadal budget and
Willem abdicated his throne. As parliament’s power of the purse increased
over the 1840s, spreads fell to 100 basis points. After the Revolutions of 1848,
which saw the establishment of a stable centralized and limited regime,
spreads typically remained less than 100 basis points through the start of
World War I.
To supplement the French and Dutch cases, it is useful to examine the rest
of the data. Figure 3, which plots yield spreads between Spanish long-term
government bonds and British consols from 1820 to 1913, indicates that
spreads fell by roughly 500 basis points after fiscal centralization in 1844.
The establishment of a stable form of limited government in 1876 also led
to a sizeable reduction in Spanish spreads.
14 The loss of tax revenues from southern provinces also aggravated Dutch finances. See
Fritschy, t’Hart and Horlings (2001).
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Figure 4. Yield spreads, Portugal, 1823–1913
Sources: See Appendix 1.
Figure 4, which plots yield spreads between Portuguese long-term
government bonds and British consols from 1823 to 1913, indicates that
spreads were higher after fiscal centralization in 1832 than beforehand. The
period from 1821 to 1851, however, was one of civil war as well as colonial
conflict.15 Portuguese spreads fell with the establishment of a stable form of
limited government in 1851. Moreover, during much of the 1850s and 1860s,
spreads in Portugal were typically 100 to 200 basis points lower than those
of Spain, its absolutist counterpart on the Iberian Peninsula.
Figure 5, which plots yield spreads between Prussian long-term
government bonds and British consols from 1815 to 1913, indicates that
spreads rose in the decades after the establishment of limited government in
Prussia in 1848. Infrequent observations from 1842 to 1869, however, may
misrepresent Prussian yield trends. Since weekly or monthly data was not
available, I used annual data (taken from the last day of trading each year)
from Homer and Sylla (1991).16 Military conflicts also played a role. Though
it did not participate in any major wars from 1815 to 1847, Prussia entered
four such conflicts from 1848 to 1871.17
15 See Birmingham (1993), Mata and Valerio (2002) and Clodfelter (2002).
16 For additional details, see Appendix 1.
17 These were the first and second Schleswig-Holstein Wars (1848–9, 1864), the
Austro-Prussian War (1866) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1). Also see Appendix 2.
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Figure 5. Yield spreads, Prussia, 1815–1913
Sources: See Appendix 1.
Indeed, qualitative accounts suggest a positive relationship between
limited government and public finances in Prussia. According to Ferguson
(1998), Rothschild lenders urged King Frederick William II (1786–97) to
implement constitutional reforms as a credible way to improve sovereign
credit risk. Tilly (1966, 1967), moreover, argues that the constitutional
reforms of 1848 strengthened the ability of the Prussian parliament to follow
sound fiscal policies. Finally, the quantitative analysis by Dincecco (2009a)
finds that limited government in Prussia led to a significant increase in per-
capita tax revenues.18
Though the evidence presented so far suggests that political
transformations had important effects on sovereign credit risk, it is not
definitive. Figure 6, which plots yield spreads for group 2 countries from 1820
to 1913, highlights the importance of controls for factors besides political
regime. By the 1870s, for instance, it is difficult to distinguish between deficit
ratios associated with the absolutist regime in Denmark and those associated
with limited regimes elsewhere. To account for the effects of violent conflict,
18 Southern Germany polities like Bavaria adopted constitutions at the start of the 1800s. To
compare Bavarian and Prussian yield spreads from 1815 to 1848, I used annual data
provided by Homer and Sylla (1991). The results indicated that spreads under the limited
government regime in Bavaria were consistently lower than spreads under the absolutist
one in Prussia.
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Figure 6. Yield spreads, group 2 countries, 1820–1913
Sources: See Appendix 1.
economic growth, fiscal and monetary policy, and other elements, I now
turn to a more rigorous quantitative analysis.
5. Statistical tests
5.1. Panel regressions
Estimations of panel data increase informative content by combining
variations across time and country. I followed Beck and Katz (1995) and
employed ordinary least squares with ‘panel-corrected’ standard errors
(PCSE), which corrects for contemporaneously correlated errors and panel
heteroskedasticity. To control for serial correlation, I included a common
AR1 term.19
The basic fixed effects specification is:
Spreadi t=β0+β1CA regimei t+β2 FL regimei t+β3 CL regimei t+γ Xi t+μi+εi t
19 Beck and Katz (1995) also show that use of a common ρ to control for serial correlation is
superior to that of unit-specific ones.
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where Spreadit is the yield spread with British consols in basis points for
country i in year t, Xit is a vector of control variables to be described, μi
represent country-specific fixed effects, and εit is the disturbance term.20
I used dummy variables for centralized and absolutist (CA), fragmented
and limited (FL), and centralized and limited (CL) regimes relative to
fragmented and absolutist ones as a clear and simple method to measure
the effect of political arrangements on sovereign credit risk.21
Hoffman and Rosenthal (1997) claim that early modern monarchs valued
warfare above all else. For the 1800s, Ferguson (2006) argues that political
events were more important to investors than economic ones since there was
a greater amount of regular information available about them. Sussman and
Yafeh (2000, 2006) also find that financial markets responded quickly to wars
and civil unrest. One might expect that the total effect of warfare on sovereign
credit risk was negative because it decreased tax revenues and increased
public expenditures. Over the long run, however, Kindleberger (1984), Tilly
(1990), Hoffman and Norberg (1994), Epstein (2000), O’Brien (2001),
Rosenthal and Wong (2007) and others argue that military competition
fostered financial innovations that allowed sovereigns to reduce credit risk.
Whether a country won or lost a conflict also influenced public finances. To
evaluate the impact of warfare on yield spreads, I included a dummy variable
that identified each year from 1750 to 1913 in which sample countries were
engaged in military conflicts in Western or Eastern Europe according to
Clodfelter (2002). Appendix 2 documents the details.
Though debt figures would also be useful to measure the effects of
warfare on public finances, continuous series were not available prior to
the 1870s (see Ferguson 2006). One unique source of data that exists
from the 1700s onwards is budgetary figures as assembled by Dincecco
(2009b). To scale estimates across time, Ferguson and Schularick (2006)
claim that sophisticated analyses of government finances typically employed
public revenues. Cain and Hopkins (1994) also argue that budget deficit-
to-revenue ratios were the statistic most preferred by investors to evaluate
macroeconomic policies.22 In accordance with the ‘gentlemanly capitalists’
of London, I used this variable as a measure of fiscal prudence. Table 5
20 Britain went off the gold standard from 1797 to 1821 and France adhered to a bimetallic
standard for much of the 1800s. To avoid risk elements that reflected exchange rate
regimes, I also tested alternative specifications that used natural logarithms of average
annual yields as the dependent variable. The results were unaffected.
21 I did not use yearly fixed effects because the number of annual observations for group 1
countries typically exceeded 120. Both Greene (2000) and Wooldridge (2003) argue that
the large cost in terms of lost degrees of freedom makes it difficult to justify yearly fixed
effects in such cases. Instead, I implemented time controls that captured widespread
shocks such as systematic risk and warfare. However, the findings were also robust to the
inclusion of annual time dummies.
22 Also see Davis and Huttenback (1986) and Flandreau and Zumer (2004).
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Table 5. Summary statistics of non-binary control variables
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Budget deficit-to-revenue ratios 0.19 0.32 −0.89 2.93
Urbanization rate 0.15 0.08 0.04 0.43
Average annual yield spreads 226 185 −101 948
Sources: See Appendix 2.
indicates that the average deficit ratio was 0.19. The lowest deficit ratio was
−0.89 for Spain in 1803 and the largest was 2.93 for France in 1790.
There also exists systematic information for debt default, an extreme
reaction to fiscal crisis that caused widespread damage to the financial sector
as well as the economy as a whole.23 Indeed, early modern executives often
resorted to default as a way to handle large debt burdens accumulated during
wars.24 To measure this effect, I introduced a dummy variable that identified
all years of partial or full defaults on publicly held debts from 1750 to 1913
according to Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) and Dincecco (2009b).
Appendix 2 provides the details.
Since internal conflict caused disruptions that increased sovereign credit
risk, we must consider the impact of domestic turmoil as well. To measure
this effect, I included a dummy variable that identified all civil wars, coups
and revolutions that occurred within sample countries from 1750 to 1913.
Appendix 2 describes the details.
One might also suppose that economic growth increased tax bases and
enabled sovereign governments to repay debts. Since reliable GDP figures
are difficult to come by before 1820, many studies of the late nineteenth
century employ measures of foreign trade as approximates of national output
(e.g. Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh 2002; Obstfeld and Taylor 2003; Ferguson
and Schularick 2006). However, systematic trade deficit and export series
from the 1700s onwards were not available. Hohenberg and Lees (1985),
Bairoch (1988) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002, 2005) argue
that there was a close relationship between urbanization rates and income
growth. To proxy for per-capita GDP, I constructed a yearly variable that
calculated urban populations as fractions of total populations for each
country. Appendix 2 describes the details.25 Controls for national income
also help account for different rates of technological innovation and adoption
across countries (see Mokyr 1998, 1999). Table 5 indicates that on average
urban populations comprised 17 percent of total populations. The lowest
23 Currency debasement was another form of government ‘misbehavior’, but systematic
data across sample countries were not found.
24 For example, two of the three defaults that Sargent and Velde (1995) describe for France
during the century prior to 1789 involved military conflicts: the 1715 episode after the War
of Spanish Succession and the 1759 one during the Seven Years’ War.
25 I used Maddison’s (2003) per-capita GDP figures as a robustness check.
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urbanization rates were 4 percent for Prussia during the second half of the
1700s and the largest were over 40 percent for the Netherlands at the start
of the 1900s.
Bordo and Rockoff (1996) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) claim that
adherence to the classic gold standard was a valuable signal of financial
integrity. To measure the effect of monetary policy, I included a dummy
variable that took a value of one for each year that a country was on gold
from the 1870s to the start of World War I. Since polities such as Spain
‘shadowed’ the gold standard while never making an official commitment,
coding was at times subjective. I relied on Meissner’s (2005) dates at which
a currency became de facto and de jure convertible into gold. Appendix 2
documents the details.
Lastly, to control for systematic risk across European asset markets, I
computed an average yield spread in basis points for all available sample
countries over the ‘safe’ British consol each year in the spirit of Bordo and
Rockoff (1996), Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) and Ferguson and Schularick
(2006). Use of a GDP-weighted benchmark spread or a CAPM-style variable
that interacted country fixed effects and country-specific risk premiums did
not significantly alter any of the results.26 Table 5 indicates that systematic
risk averaged 226 basis points. Fueled by the Dutch Republic, the lowest
‘world’ spreads occurred in the 1780s and were negative. The largest (948
basis points) occurred in 1811 at the height of the Napoleonic Wars.
The econometric set-up assumes that it is possible to disentangle political
regimes from factors such as violent conflicts and economic fundamentals.
Since political arrangements influenced all of these characteristics,
coefficients on the control variables rather than those on the regime ones
themselves may capture some of the positive effects of institutional reforms.
Hence, regime coefficients are likely to underestimate the total impact of
political arrangements on sovereign credit risk.
5.2. Structural break tests
Structural break tests, which assume no a priori knowledge of major turning
points in the revenue series for group 1 countries, supplement the PCSE
regression analysis by letting the data ‘speak’ for themselves.27 I use the
methodology proposed by Bai and Perron (2003) that identifies multiple
structural changes in means while allowing for serial correlation. It thus
improves upon the ‘moving windows’ technique that relies upon sequential
single structural change methods.
26 Data were not available to produce a debt-weighted average spread.
27 Historical applications include Willard, Guinnane and Rosen (1996), Brown and
Burdekin (2000), Sussman and Yafeh (2000), Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh (2002) and
Dincecco (2009a, 2009b).
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A program created for the Regression Analysis of Time Series (RATS)
software performs the Bai−Perron procedure, which estimates the following
regression for each sample country:
Spreadt = β0 + l=1,...,L βl Spreadt−l + εt
where Spreadit is the yield spread with British consols in basis points in
year t, β0 and β1 through βL are parameters to be estimated, and εt is the
disturbance term. I allowed up to five significant yearly lags of the dependent
variable (L = 5). The RATS routine, which uses a dynamic programming
algorithm to evaluate which final partitioning of the time series data achieves
a global minimization of the overall sum of squared residuals, returns the
optimal set of break points.
The RATS procedure calls for the selection of a maximum number of
‘best’ turning points in the time series for each country subject to a minimum
number of observations between data segments. As Willard, Guinnane and
Rosen (1996) point out, there is always a trade-off in determining parameter
values. A minimum space of two observations eliminates the chance of
confounding the effects of different events but ends up analyzing blips (false
positives that characterize certain events as ‘long-lasting’ that really were not)
rather than turning points. Longer periods of analysis, however, increase the
likelihood of missing important shifts (false negatives).
There are also data limitations to consider. Though gaps from 1789 to 1815
in the French and Dutch yield series prevented the identification of turning
points associated with fiscal centralization, it was still possible to capture
post-1815 breaks for limited government. The same held for Portugal, where
the yield series began just before centralization, and Prussia, where it began
just afterwards. After some experimentation, I selected the best three breaks
with at least 15 observations (i.e. 15 years) per segment.28 A long continuous
run of data set England apart from other group 1 countries. Though the
English series began after the establishment of a centralized and limited
regime, it remains useful to study the relationship between military conflicts,
political regimes and credit risk.
6. Statistical evidence
Table 6, which shows the results of the panel regressions, indicates that
fragmented and absolutist regimes displayed significantly higher levels of
sovereign credit risk than the other regime types. These findings held for
group 1 countries only (column 1) and when group 2 countries were included
(column 2). Ceteris paribus, the move to a centralized and absolutist regime
28 I also set the maximum number of breaks to 2, 4 or 5 and the minimum number of
observations to 10 or 20. The findings were generally robust to such changes in parameter
values.
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Table 6. Regression results for political regimes and sovereign credit risk
(1) (2)
Group 1 only Groups 1 and 2
Centralized and absolutist regimes −147.99∗∗∗ −153.12∗∗∗
(2.90) (5.74)
Fragmented and limited regimes −383.46∗∗∗ −384.74∗∗∗
(7.48) (14.49)
Centralized and limited regimes −192.70∗∗∗ −186.05∗∗∗
(3.09) (5.83)
Military conflicts 21.06∗∗ 21.07∗∗∗
(2.39) (5.24)
Deficit-to-revenue ratios 34.45∗ 30.81∗∗∗
(1.71) (4.41)
Defaults 61.76 40.89∗
(1.27) (1.89)
Civil wars, coups, revolutions 50.66∗∗ 44.62∗∗∗
(2.32) (4.19)
Urbanization rate −317.51 −141.32
(0.98) (0.94)
Gold standard 23.98 −16.26
(0.98) (1.38)
Average yield spread 22.43∗∗∗ 26.19∗∗∗
(11.69) (21.30)
Netherlands 71.78 46.79∗∗
(1.47) (2.21)
Prussia 1.95 −0.44
(0.09) (0.00)
Spain 442.10∗∗∗ 432.54∗∗∗
(6.90) (12.34)
Austria–Hungary 110.46∗∗∗
(6.71)
Belgium 34.41∗∗∗
(3.08)
Denmark 12.88
(0.85)
Italy 172.20∗∗∗
(12.08)
Portugal 244.15∗∗∗
(6.53)
Sweden 41.72∗∗
(2.12)
Constant 245.68∗∗∗ 222.89∗∗∗
(6.90) (12.76)
Observations 346 652
R2 0.400 0.357
Wald χ2 621.79 3850.36
Sources: See text.
∗Significant at 10 percent level, ∗∗Significant at 5 percent level, ∗∗∗Significant at
1 percent level.
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual yield spread with the British consol in basis
points. The estimation technique is OLS with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). A
common AR1 term was added to correct for serial correlation. Z-statistics in absolute values
are in parentheses. Group 1: France, the Netherlands, Prussia and Spain. Group 2:
Austria–Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Sweden. For details about the
regression variables, see Appendix 2.
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decreased yield spreads by 148 to 153 basis points. This result suggests that
the positive impact of new revenues outweighed the negative impact of exec-
utive consolidation of fiscal powers. The move to a centralized and limited
regime decreased yield spreads by 186 to 193 basis points and the move to
the fragmented and limited one by 383 to 385 basis points.29 The findings
were also robust to checks that used alternative regime classifications.30
As expected, warfare had a significant negative impact on sovereign
credit risk. Common shocks to European asset markets (e.g. large-scale
military conflicts) were also associated with a significant increase in yield
spreads. Domestic turmoil (civil wars, coups and revolutions) significantly
worsened credit risk as well. Budget deficits and defaults also had negative
effects, though to a lesser extent. Urbanization rates and gold standard
adherence, meanwhile, had negligible impacts.31 Finally, Spain, Austria–
Hungary, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Sweden all had notably larger spreads
than did France.
Table 7, which displays the results of the structural break tests, reveals
close relationships between major turning points in the yield spread series
and political transformations that enhanced public finances. It also highlights
the link between those innovations and military competition and conflicts.
In the Netherlands, the best breaks came with the start of the Belgian War of
Independence (1830), near limited government (1850), and with an uniden-
tified event (1885). Limited government, which occurred during the Year of
Revolutions in 1848, led to a significant decrease in spreads (29 percent).
In France, the first turning point occurred with the July Revolution (1830)
and the establishment of the short-lived constitutional regime (1830–47) that
followed. Limited government led to a significant (73 percent) decrease in
yield spreads. A second break coincided with the coup d’e´tat and subsequent
establishment of an authoritarian regime by Napoleon III at the start of the
1850s. As expected, it was associated with a significant (163 percent) increase
in spreads. The final break (1871) came with the establishment of limited
government (1870) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71). France’s loss
to Prussia appears to have offset the positive effects of limited government
over the short term. Figure 1, however, indicates that French spreads fell
steadily from 1872 onwards. By the 1880s, they resembled those under the
constitutional ‘July’ regime from 50 years before.
29 Recall that the Dutch Republic, characterized by 16 observations, was the sole case
among sample countries of a fragmented and limited regime. Hence, the magnitude of
this result should be interpreted with care.
30 Parliaments may have required time to see how well executives would honor
commitments. The first alternative allowed for uncertainty over how long new limited
regimes would last by lagging their start dates by 5 or 10 years. The second alternative
classified the ‘borderline’ political regime in France (1830–47) as centralized and limited
rather than as centralized and absolutist.
31 Use of per-capita GDP figures rather than urbanization rates did not significantly affect
the findings.
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Table 7. Major breaks in yield spread series
Year Percent change Event
England
(1750–1913)
1775 27.51∗∗∗ Start of War of American
Independence (1775–83)(5.47)
1798 11.36∗∗ Start of Napoleonic Wars (1799–1815)
(2.37)
1815 −18.19∗∗∗ End of Napoleonic Wars (1799–1815)
(5.45)
France
(1815–1913)
1829 −73.73∗∗∗ July Revolution (1830) / Short-lived
constitutional regime (1830–47)(5.75)
1847 163.53∗∗∗ Year of Revolutions (1848) / Coup by
Napoleon III (1851)(5.05)
1871 4.11 Limited government (1870) /
Franco-Prussian War (1870–1)(0.78)
Netherlands
(1815–1913)
1830 33.34∗∗∗ Belgian Revolt (1830) / Belgian War of
Independence (1830–3)(2.63)
1848 −29.16∗∗∗ Limited government (1848) / Year of
Revolutions (1848)(3.05)
1885 −60.48∗∗∗ Unidentified event
(7.93)
Portugal
(1823–1902)
1848 26.54 Limited government (1851) / Colonial
Wars in Guinea (1840s)(1.19)
1863 −18.32 Unidentified event
(1.34)
1887 31.64 Banking crisis (1890s)
(1.03)
Prussia
(1815–1913)
1829 −51.58∗∗∗ 1st Zollverein customs union (1834)
(4.28)
1847 56.44∗∗∗ Limited government (1848) / 1st
Schleswig-Holstein War (1848–9)(5.39)
1866 20.51∗∗∗ Austro-Prussian War (1866)
(3.69)
Spain
(1821–1913)
1835 −69.33∗∗∗ End of 1st Carlist War (1833–9)
(4.63)
1864 149.54∗∗∗ Start of Naval War with Peru (1865–6)
(3.50)
1879 −51.70∗∗ Limited government (1876) / End of
3rd Carlist War (1872–6)(2.50)
Sources: See text.
∗Significant at 10 percent level, ∗∗Significant at 5 percent level, ∗∗∗Significant at 1 percent
level.
Notes: The first column lists the relevant sample countries. The second column displays the
years for the best three structural breaks over the years shown for each polity as determined
by the algorithm described in the text. The third column reports the percentage change in
yield spreads over the fifteen years following the break in question as compared to the fifteen
years that preceded it. T-statistics in absolute values are in parentheses. The final column
offers brief ‘explanations’ for the turning points, which are elaborated upon in the text. For
England, yields on British consols rather than spreads were tested.
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In Portugal, the turning point that occurred in 1848 coincided with the
establishment of limited government in 1851 as well as the 1840s colonial wars
in Guinea. By the mid 1850s, Portuguese spreads had fallen by over 300 basis
points. Other Portuguese breaks were associated with an unidentified event
(1863) and the 1890s banking crisis. In Prussia, we observe turning points
near the first Zollverein customs agreement in 1834, near the establishment
of a centralized and limited regime in 1848 and the first Schleswig-Holstein
War (1848–9), and with the Austro-Prussian War (1866). Section 4 examines
why limited government in Prussia did not result in a spread reduction.
The best three turning points for Spain occurred at the end of the
first Carlist Civil War (1833–9), near the start of the Naval War against
Peru (1864), and near limited government (1879). Limited government,
established at the end of the third Carlist Civil War (1872–6), was associated
with a large decrease in yield spreads (52 percent). Curiously, fiscal
centralization, which occurred in 1844 during a decade of reforms, was
not included as one of the top Spanish breaks. Figure 4, however, shows
that yield spreads fell by roughly 500 basis points in the decade or so that
followed this political change.
Turning points in the English yield series, which began after the
establishment of a centralized and limited regime, further highlight the
role of military conflicts. The top three breaks came at the start of War of
American Independence (1775) and near the start (1798) and finish (1815)
of the Napoleonic Wars. In each case, we observe a significant increase in
consol yields at the conflict’s outbreak (1775, 1798) and a significant decrease
at war’s end (1815).
7. Conclusion
This article examines the relationship between political regimes and
sovereign credit risk in Europe from 1750 to 1913. Panel regressions indicate
that centralized and/or limited regimes were associated with significant
creditworthiness improvements relative to fragmented and absolutist ones.
Structural break tests that assume no a priori knowledge of possible turning
points in the yield series support these conclusions.
Historical analysis reveals general patterns in the evolution of political
regimes and public finances. Prior to the 1800s, the most urgent problem
facing most polities was fiscal fragmentation. Since Old Regime monarchs
were already ‘constrained’ by local tax authorities, it was not until after
centralization that national parliaments became ‘the’ mechanism by which
to hold crowns accountable.
We lose sight of this point when studying English financial history, which
was exceptional. By managing to avoid the problems of severe fragmentation
that hampered Continental countries for so long, England was in a better
52 European Review of Economic History
position for development. Our key lesson from history, then, is simple but
powerful. Today’s emerging economies must try to adopt fiscal structures
that not only limit the power of executives to behave recklessly, but that also
lend enough authority to central governments to collect sufficient tax funds.
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Appendix 1. Sources for the yield data
The abbreviation GFD denotes the Global Financial Database. For additional
details, see the text.
Austria–Hungary. Austrian data on 10-year government bonds were drawn
from the GFD. For 1874–9, the silver 5s bond was used; for 1880–1913,
the gold 4s bond. For 1874–9, monthly data were used to compute yearly
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averages; for 1880–1913, weekly data. Yields were for bonds traded in
London.
Belgium. Belgian data on 10-year government bonds were drawn from the
GFD. For 1832–44, the 5 percent Belgian bond was used; for 1845–58, the 4.5
percent bond; for 1859 onwards, the 3 percent bond. For 1832–84, monthly
data were used to compute yearly averages; for 1885–98, biweekly data;
for 1889–1913, monthly data. Note that the resulting yield series matched
up closely with annual observations (taken from the last day of trading each
year) from Homer and Sylla (1991). Yields were for bonds traded in Brussels.
Denmark. Danish data on 10-year government bonds were drawn from the
GFD. For 1821–5 and 1852–8, the 5s bond was used; for 1825–52, the 3s
bond; for 1864–94 the consolidated 4s bond. In 1895 the consolidated 4s
bond was converted into 3.5 percent consols, which were used through 1913.
Data were unavailable for 1859–63. Monthly data were used to compute
yearly averages from 1821 to 1913. Yields were for bonds traded in London.
England. The British series on perpetual government bonds were drawn
from the GFD. For 1750–3, the 3 percent yield on annuities was used. For
1754 onwards, the British consol was used, which paid 3 percent until 1888,
2.75 percent from 1889 to 1906, and 2.5 percent from 1907 to 1913. For
1750–1879, monthly data were used to compute yearly averages; for 1880–
1913, weekly data. Note that the resulting yield series matched up closely
with annual observations (taken from the last day of trading each year) from
Homer and Sylla (1991). Yields were for bonds traded in London.
France. No single debt instrument akin to the British consol existed in France
prior to the nineteenth century, making it difficult to identify ‘the’ interest
rate paid on government loans. Indeed, bonds could be perpetual or finite,
redeemable or not, and repudiated when revenues ran thin. The eighteenth-
century yield data that I used were collected by Velde and Weir (1992), who
chose the October loan as the French asset that best captured yields on long-
term government bonds from 1750 to 1793. Prior to 1770, the October loan
was a private debt of the Compagnie des Indes. From 1770 onwards, it was a
perpetual debt of the French government. From 1793 to 1796, the Paris Stock
Exchange was closed off and on. Data for 1794–1800 were unvailable, though
a perpetual 5 percent consolidated bond was issued in 1798. It continued
to trade until 1825, when the French central government refunded it and
issued a perpetual 3 percent bond, which became the primary government
bond until 1949. Note that a new bond paying quarterly interest replaced the
previous 3 percent one in 1862. French data for the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries were supplied courtesy of Jean-Laurent Rosenthal for 1801–72 and
drawn from the GFD for 1873–1913. For 1750–1879, monthly data were
used to compute yearly averages; for 1880–1913, weekly data. Yields were for
bonds traded on the Paris Stock Exchange.
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Italy. Italian data on long-term government bonds were drawn from the
GFD. The average maturity was six years. For 1862–99, the consolidated 5
percent bond was used; for 1900–13, the 3.5 percent consol bond. Monthly
data were used to compute yearly averages from 1862 to 1913. Yields were
for bonds traded in London.
The Netherlands. Public bonds in the Dutch Republic were issued by several
authorities, including the Union itself, provinces, and cities. Joost Jonker,
Oscar Gelderblom and Heleen Kole collected the Dutch data for 1780–
1810. Prior to 1780, too little data existed to form a comprehensive series. For
1780–95, the source was the Dutch newspaper Maandelijksche Hollandsche,
which reported yields on various government bonds from securities auctions
in Amsterdam. The Holland and Westfriesland perpetual 2.5 percent bond
was selected. Like the October loan in eighteenth-century France, this asset
best captured long-term yield levels. For 1796–1813, the source was the
Dutch newspaper Prijscourant der Effecten. In this case, perpetual 2.5 percent
national bonds were used. Data were unavailable for 1812. In 1814, the
entire national debt, with interest rates ranging from 1.25 to 7 percent, was
converted into a single one at a rate of 2.5 percent. The data source for
1814–1913 was the GFD. For 1780–96, monthly data were used to compute
yearly averages; for 1797–1812, biweekly data; for 1814–81, monthly data;
for 1882, biweekly data; for 1883–1913, weekly data. Note that the resulting
nineteenth-century yield series matched up closely with annual observations
that came from the Dutch National Accounts. Nineteenth- and twentieth-
century bonds were also traded in Amsterdam.
Portugal. Portuguese data on 10-year government bonds were drawn from the
GFD. For 1823–95 and 1903–13, the 3 percent bond was used. Data were
unavailable for 1903. Monthly data were used to compute yearly averages
for 1823–1913. Note that the resulting yield series matched up closely with
monthly observations gathered by hand from Le Moniteur Universel and The
Economist for all available years from 1835 to 1870. Yields were for bonds
traded in London.
Prussia. Prussian data on 10-year government bonds from 1815 to 1841
were drawn from the GFD. For 1842–69, however, this source used
Bavarian bonds. Prussian data on 10-year government bonds were thus
drawn from Homer and Sylla (1991) during those years. 4s bonds
were used, except for 1844–52, when 3.5s bonds were used due to
a lack of data. The Prussian data on 10-year government bonds for
1870–1913 were also drawn from the GFD. Prussian 4 percent consols
were used for 1870–97 and German 3 percent Imperial loans for
1898–1913. For 1815–41, monthly data were used to compute yearly averages;
for 1842–69, annual data (taken from the last day of trading each year); for
1870–80, monthly data, for 1881–1913, weekly data. Note that the resulting
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yield series taken from the GFD matched up closely with annual observations
(taken from the last day of trading each year) for 1815–41 and 1870–80 from
Homer and Sylla (1991). Yields were for bonds traded in Berlin.
Spain. As in Old Regime France, the Spanish crown issued a variety of
disparate debt instruments prior to 1815 (see Tortella and Comı`n 2001).
However, the Spanish yields series did not begin until 1821. Data were for
10-year government bonds drawn from the GFD. For 1823–36, 5s bonds
were used. For 1836–81, 3s bonds were used. In 1881, the 3s were converted
into a 1 percent bond. In 1882, the 1 percent bond was converted into a
1.25 percent one, and later into a 4 percent one. The 4 percent bond was
used from 1882 to 1913. Monthly data were used for 1821–1913 to compute
yearly averages. Note that the resulting yield series matched up closely with
monthly observations gathered by hand from Le Moniteur Universel and The
Economist for 1823–70. London yields were used for the entire series except
for 1913 when the Madrid yield was used.
Sweden. Swedish data on 10-year government bonds were drawn from the
GFD. For 1868–78, the 5s bond was used; for 1878–94, the 4s bond; for
1894–1913, the 3s bond. Monthly data were used to compute yearly averages
for 1868–1913. Note that the resulting yield series matched up closely with
annual observations (taken from the last day of trading each year) from
Homer and Sylla (1991) for all available years from 1855 to 1913. Yields were
for bonds traded in London.
Appendix 2. Regression variables
For additional details, see Sections 5 and 6 of the text.
The dependent variable is the spread between the average annual yield
on long-term government bonds for each sample country and the average
annual yield on the British consol as expressed in basis points.
The dummy variable for fragmented and absolutist political regimes takes
a value of one for each year that a sample country possessed a fragmented
and absolutist regime from 1750 to 1913. As the benchmark case, I omitted it
from the regression specifications. The dummy variable for centralized and
absolutist political regimes takes a value of one for each year that a sample
country possessed a centralized and absolutist regime from 1750 to 1913.
The dummy variable for fragmented and limited political regimes takes a
value of one for each year that a sample country possessed a fragmented
and limited regime from 1750 to 1913. There is only one such case among
sample countries; for additional details, see Section 4. The dummy variable
for centralized and limited political regimes takes a value of one for each year
that a sample country possessed a centralized and limited regime from 1750
to 1913.
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Table A1. European military conflicts, 1750–1913
Conflict Year(s) Combatants
Seven Years’ War 1756–63 Ah, Fr, Ru, Sp, Sw v. En, Pt, Pr
Corsican War 1768–9 Co v. Fr
War of the Bavarian Succession 1778–89 Ah v. Pr
Russo-Swedish War 1788–90 Ru v. Sw
War of the 1st Coalition 1792–7 Ah, En, Nl, Pt, Pr, Sp v. Fr
War of the 2nd Coalition 1798–1801 Ah, En, Pr, Ru, Tr v. Fr, Nl
Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815)
War of the 3rd Coalition 1805–7 Ah, En, Pr, Ru, Sw v. Fr, Nl, Pl
Peninsular War 1807–14 En, Pt, Sp v. Fr, Nl
Austrian War 1809 Ah v. Fr, Nl
Russian Campaign 1812 Ah, Dk, Ru v. Fr, Nl, Pl
Leipzig Campaign 1813 En, Pr, Ru, Sw v. Fr, Nl
Campaign in France 1814 En, Nl, Ru, Pr, Sw v. Fr
Austrian Campaign 1815 Ah v. Fr
Waterloo Campaign 1815 Ah, En, Nl, Pt, Pr, Sp v. Fr
Russo-Swedish War 1808–9 Ru v. Sw
Riego Rebellion 1823 Fr v. Sp
Belgian War of Independence 1830–3 Be, En, Fr v. Nl
Austro-Sardo War 1848–9 Ah v. Sa
1st Italian War of Independence 1848–9 Ah, Fr, Sp v. It
1st Schleswig-Holstein War 1848–9 Dk, Sw v. Pr
Crimean War 1853–6 En, Fr, Tr v. Ru
Franco-Austrian War 1859 Ah v. Fr
2nd Italian War of Independence 1859–61 Ah v. It
2nd Schleswig-Holstein War 1864 Ah, Pr v. Dk
Austro-Prussian War 1866 Ah v. It, Pr
Battle of Mentana 1867 Fr v. It
Franco-Prussian War 1870–1 Fr v. Pr
Austrian Conquest of Bosnia 1878 Ah v. Bo
Source: Clodfelter (2002).
Notes: Country abbreviations are Austria–Hungary (Ah), Belgium (Be), Bosnia (Bo),
Corsica (Co), Denmark (Dk), England (En), France (Fr), Italy (It), the Netherlands (Nl),
Poland (Pl), Portugal (Pt), Prussia (Pr), Russia (Ru), Sardinia (Sa), Spain (Sp), Sweden
(Sw) and Turkey (Tr).
The country dummy variable takes a value of one to identify individual
sample countries.
Wars and war years are from Clodfelter (2002). All conflicts fought at least
in part in Western Europe (as well as those fought at least in part in Eastern
Europe so long as they involved at least one sample country) from 1750 to
1913 were included. Table A1 provides a complete list.
The default dummy variable takes a value of one for each year that a
national government partially or fully defaulted on its publicly held debt
from 1750 to 1913 according to Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) and
Dincecco (2009b). Table A3 provides a complete list.
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Table A2. European civil wars, coups and revolutions, 1750–1913
Year(s) Event
Austria–Hungary 1848 Year of Revolutions
Belgium 1789–90 Brabant Revolution
1830 Belgian Revolution
Denmark 1848 Year of Revolutions
England No civil war, coup or revolution from
1750 to 1913
France 1789–99 French Revolution
1799 Coup by Napoleon I
1815 Bourbon Restoration
1830 July Revolution
1848 Year of Revolutions
1851 Coup by Napoleon III
1870 Fall of 2nd empire
1871 Paris Comune
Italy No civil war, coup, or revolution from
1861 to 1913
Netherlands 1785 Batavian Revolution
1814–15 Establishment of Dutch Kingdom
1830 Belgian Revolution
1848 Year of Revolutions
Portugal 1808 Revolution of 1808
1820 Revolution of 1820
1820–3 1st Civil War of Portuguese Revolution
1823 Coup of 1823
1827–8 Miguelite Insurrection
1832–4 2nd Civil War of Portuguese Revolution
1836 Coup of 1836
1846–7 3rd Civil War of Portuguese Revolution
1849 Costa Cabral Coup
1851 Saldanha Coup
1910 Establishment of 1st Portuguese Republic
Prussia 1848 Year of Revolutions
Spain 1820 Coup of 1820
1823 Restoration of 1823
1833–9 1st Carlist War
1843 Moderate Coup
1847–9 Matiners’ (2nd Carlist) War
1854 Rebellion of 1854
1863 Government collapse of 1863
1868–70 Glorious Revolution
1872–6 3rd Carlist War (encompasses the
Restoration of 1874)
1909 La Semana Tra´gica
Sweden 1772 Coup of 1772
1792 Assassination of Gustav III
1809 Coup against Gustav IV
Source: Dincecco (2009a).
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Table A3. Defaults in Europe, 1750–1913
Year
Austria–Hungary 1802, 1805, 1811, 1816, 1868
England No defaults from 1750 to 1913
France 1759, 1770, 1788, 1797
Netherlands 1810
Prussia 1807, 1813
Spain 1820, 1831, 1834, 1851, 1867, 1872, 1882
Belgium No defaults from 1831 to 1913
Denmark No defaults from 1815 to 1913
Italy No defaults from 1861 to 1913
Portugal 1837, 1841, 1845, 1852, 1890
Sweden No defaults from 1815 to 1913
Sources: Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) and Dincecco (2009b).
The deficit variable, taken from Dincecco (2009b), is the budget deficit-
to-revenue ratio for each sample country for each available year from 1750
to 1913.
The dummy variable for civil wars, coups and revolutions takes a value of
one for each year of civil war, coup or revolution within sample countries
from 1750 to 1913 according to Dincecco (2009a). Table A2 provides a
complete list. Insurrections, massacres, riots and uprisings were generally
not included.
The urbanization variable calculates the urban population as a fraction of
the total population for each sample country annually. All urban population
figures are from De Vries (1984). Figures for 1750 and 1800 are from
appendix 3, pp. 305–37, and figures for 1850, 1890 and 1980 are from
table 4.8, pp. 44–7, for cities with populations of at least 10,000 inhabitants
through 1850, with at least 20,000 inhabitants in 1890, and with at least
100,000 inhabitants in 1980. All intermediate years were interpolated. De
Vries provides urbanization figures for Germany rather than for Prussia and
for Scandinavia rather than for Denmark or Sweden. Urbanization figures
for Austria–Hungary include Bohemia. For country population sources, see
Dincecco (2009a).
The per-capita GDP variable, which comes from Maddison (2003), takes
the natural logarithm of per-capita GDP in 1990 international Geary-Khamis
dollars for sample countries from 1750 to 1913. Data were available for 1700
and 1820–1913. All intermediate years were interpolated. Maddison provides
per-capita GDP figures for Germany rather than for Prussia.
The gold variable dummy variable takes a value of one for each year that
a country was on gold according to Meissner (2005), who employs a strict
measure of gold adherence that chooses the year in which a currency became
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de facto and de jure convertible into gold. Adoption years were England,
1821; Portugal, 1854; Prussia, 1872; Denmark, 1873; Sweden, 1873; the
Netherlands, 1875; Belgium, 1878; France, 1878; and Italy, 1884. Neither
Austria–Hungary nor Spain formally adopted the gold standard prior to
1913.
The average spread variable is the average yield spread in basis points for
all available sample countries over the ‘safe’ British consol for each year from
1750 to 1913.
